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I. Introduction 
The following is an update on Alaska legislative activity and case law 
relating to oil, gas and mineral law from August 1, 2015 to July 1, 2016.   
II. Legislative and Regulatory Developments 
The Second Regular Session of the 29th Alaska Legislature began 
Tuesday, January 19, 2016, and ended on Wednesday, May 18, 2016; the 
Third Special Session of the 29th Alaska Legislature began Saturday, 
October 24, 2015, and ended Thursday, November 5, 2015; the Fourth 
Special Session of the 29th Alaska Legislature began on Monday, May 23, 
2016, and ended on Sunday, June 19, 2016; and the Fifth Special Session 
Special Session of the 29th Alaska Legislature began Monday July 11, 
2016, and ended on Monday, July 18, 2016.  The following is a discussion 
of notable legislation. 
A. Senate Bill 3001 
Senate Bill 3001 (“SB 3001”)—Making supplemental appropriations; 
making appropriations to capitalize funds; and providing for an effective 
date. 
The Alaska Legislature passed SB 3001 in support of the Alaska 
liquefied natural gas project, authorizing therein the appropriation of 
various funds unto the Department of Law, civil division, oil, gas, and 
mining; the Department of Natural Resources, administration and support 
services, North Slope gas commercialization; the Department of Revenue, 
administration and support, natural gas commercialization; and the Alaska 
liquefied natural gas project fund.1   
SB 3001 was signed into law on November 20, 2015. 
B. House Bill 373 
House Bill 373 (“HB 373”)—An act approving and ratifying the sale of 
royalty oil by the State of Alaska to Tesoro Corporation and Tesoro 
Refining and Marketing Company LLC; and providing for an effective 
date.  
Section 1 of HB 373 amends the uncodified law of the State of Alaska by 
adding a new section approving and ratifying the agreement for the sale and 
purchase of state royalty oil between and among the State of Alaska and 
                                                                                                             
 1. For further discussion of the purpose and scope of the Alaska liquefied natural gas 
project, see Ryan J. Morgan, Steven A. Rhodes, and Zachary H. Barrett, Alaska, 2 Tex. 
A&M L. Rev. (Surv. on Oil & Gas) 11, 15–19 (2015).  
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Tesoro Corporation and Tesoro Refining and Marketing Company LLC, 
and reciting that this section constitutes legislative approval under AS 
38.06.055.  
Section 2 of HB 373 established that Section 1 of HB 373 take effect 
immediately.  
HB 373 was signed into law on April 24, 2016.  
C. House Bill 105 
House Bill 105 (“HB 105”)—An act facilitating the ability of the Alaska 
Industrial Development and Export Authority to implement a liquefied 
natural gas production plant and natural gas energy projects and distribution 
systems in the state. 
Section 1 of HB 105 amended the uncodified law of the State of Alaska 
by adding a new section reciting the intent of the Legislature to advance the 
Interior energy project, a project intended to bring affordable natural gas to 
as many residents of Interior Alaska communities as possible as quickly as 
possible; and to facilitate the Alaska Industrial Development and Export 
Authority’s use of competitive solicitation process “to select private entities 
to participate in developing the liquefied natural gas production plant 
capacity and affiliated infrastructure.”2  
Section 6 of HB 105 amends AS Section 44.88.170 by adding a new 
subsection, AS Section 44.88.170(c), that limits the authority of Alaska 
Industrial Development and Export Authority to “enter into a gas supply 
contract with a natural gas producer to provide natural gas to Interior 
Alaska as a primary market” without legislative authority, “unless the 
contract is for the benefit of a natural gas liquefaction or distribution utility 
that is owned by the authority or a subsidiary of the authority and the 
contract is for the natural gas producer to provide the utility, and only the 
utility, with a natural gas supply that the utility uses to serve customers in 
Interior Alaska.”3  
Section 15 of HB 105 established that the Act would take effect 
immediately. 
Section 14 of HB 105 established that the Act is repealed June 30, 2025.  
HB 105 was signed into law on September 10, 2015.  
  
                                                                                                             
 2. H.B. 105, § 1, 29th Leg. (Alaska 2015).  
 3. ALASKA STAT. § 44.88.170(c) (2015). 
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D. House Bill 247 
House Bill 247 (“HB 247”)—Oil Royalties; Tax Credit; Etc.—is a bill 
that addresses royalty and tax credit incentives relating to the oil and gas 
industry.  Below are some of the more notable changes.  
1. House Bill 247, Section 1: Amendment Alaska Statutes Section 
31.05.030 
Section 1 of HB 247 amends AS Section 31.05.030 by adding a new 
subsection, AS Section 31.05.030(n), that instructs the Alaska Oil and Gas 
Conservation Commissioner, upon request of the Commissioner of 
Revenue, to determine the commencement of regular production from a 
lease or property regarding the application of certain tax reductions under 
AS Section 43.55.160(f) and AS Section 43.55.160(g). 
2. House Bill 247, Section 9: Amendment Alaska Statutes Section 
43.05.230 
Section 9 of HB 247 amends AS Section 43.05.230 by adding a new 
subsection, AS Section 43.05.230, that instructs the Department of Revenue 
to make public, by April 30 of each year, the names of each person from 
which they have purchased a transferable tax credit under AS Section 
43.55.028, as well as “the aggregate amount of the tax credit certificates 
purchased from the person in the preceding calendar year.”4 
3. House Bill 247, Section 14: Amendment Alaska Statutes Section 
43.55.011(k) 
Section 14 of HB 247 amends AS Section 43.55.011(k) by removing a 
sunset provision that would have terminated the provision in the year 2022, 
and by establishing a cap of one dollar per barrel of oil for oil produced 
from a lease or property in the Cook Inlet sedimentary basin for the tax 
levied pursuant to AS Section 43.55.011(e).  
4. House Bill 247, Section 16: Amendment Alaska Statutes Section 
43.55.020(a) 
Section 16 of HB 247 amends AS Section 43.55.020(a) by adding two 
new subsections to AS Section 43.55.020(a)(7) that address installment 
payments for taxes levied pursuant to AS Section 43.55.011(e) for oil and 
gas produced on or after January 1, 2022. First, Section 16 of HB 247 
amends AS Section 43.55.020(a)(7) by adding subsection AS Section 
                                                                                                             
 4. ALASKA STAT. § 43.05.230(l)(2) (2016). 
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43.55.020(a)(7)(F), that addresses oil that is subject to AS Section 
43.55.011(k), “for each lease or property, the greater of (i) zero; or (ii) 35 
percent multiplied by the remainder obtained by subtracting 1/12 of the 
producer's adjusted lease expenditures for the calendar year of production 
under AS 43.55.165 and 43.55.170 that are deductible under AS 43.55.160 
for the oil produced from the lease or property from the gross value at the 
point of production of the oil, produced from the lease or property during 
the month for which the installment payment is calculated.”5 Second, 
Section 16 of HB 247 amends AS Section 43.55.020(a) by adding 
subsection AS Section 43.55.020(a)(7)(G), that addresses gas that is subject 
to AS Section 43.55.011(j) and AS Section 43.55.011(o), “for each lease or 
property, the greater of (i) zero; or (ii) 13 percent of the gross value at the 
point of production of the gas produced from the lease or property during 
the month for which the installment payment is calculated.”6 
Section 16 of HB 247 also amends AS Section 43.55.020(a) by adding a 
new subsection, AS Section 43.55.020(a)(10), establishing that an amount 
calculated under AS Section 43.55.020(a)(7)(F) or (G) of this subsection: 
for oil or gas subject to AS 43.55.011(j), (k), or (o) may not 
exceed the product obtained by carrying out the calculation set 
out in AS 43.55.011(j)(1) or (2) or 43.55.011(o), as applicable, 
for gas, or set out in AS 43.55.011(k) for oil, but substituting in 
AS 43.55.011(j)(1)(A) or (2)(A) or 43.55.011(o), as applicable, 
the amount of taxable gas produced during the month for the 
amount of taxable gas produced during the calendar year and 
substituting in AS 43.55.011(k) the amount of taxable oil 
produced during the month for the amount of taxable oil 
produced during the calendar year.7 
5. House Bill 247, Section 18: Amendment Alaska Statutes Section 
43.55.023(b) 
Section 18 of HB 247 amends AS Section 43.55.023(b) by establishing a 
sunset date for a tax credit in the amount of twenty-five percent of a 
carried-forward annual loss, limiting the applicability to lease expenditures 
incurred to explore for, develop, or produce oil or gas deposits located 
south of 68 degrees North latitude on or after January 1, 2017; and reducing 
said tax credit to fifteen percent of a carried-forward annual loss, for lease 
                                                                                                             
 5. ALASKA STAT. § 43.55.020(a)(7)(F) (2016). 
 6. ALASKA STAT. § 43.55.020(a)(7)(G) (2016). 
 7. ALASKA STAT. § 43.55.020(a)(10) (2016). 
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expenditures to explore for, develop, or produce oil or gas deposits located 
south of 68 degrees North latitude incurred on or after January 1, 2017. 
Further, Section 18 of HB 247 establishes that for “lease expenditures 
incurred on or after January 1, 2017, any reduction under AS 43.55.160(f) 
or (g) is added back to the calculation of production tax values for that 
calendar year under AS 43.55.160 for the determination of a carried-
forward annual loss.”8  
Section 18 of HB 247 also amends AS Section 43.55.023(b) to limit the 
applicability of said tax credit for lease expenditures incurred to explore for, 
develop, or produce oil or gas deposits located in the Cook Inlet 
sedimentary basin to those made before January 1, 2018.  
6. House Bill 247, Section 19: Amendment Alaska Statutes Section 
43.55.023(l) 
Section 19 of HB 247 amends AS Section 43.55.023(l) to reduce the tax 
credit, established therein, for well and lease expenditures incurred south of 
68 degrees North latitude from forty percent of that expenditure incurred 
before January 1, 2017; to twenty percent of that expenditure incurred on or 
after January 1, 2017; and limiting the applicability of said tax credit for 
well or lease expenditures incurred to explore for, develop, or produce oil 
or gas deposits located in the Cook inlet sedimentary basin, before January 
1, 2018.  
7. House Bill 247, Section 23: Amendment Alaska Statutes Section 
43.55.028(e) 
Section 23 of HB 247 amends AS Section 43.55.028(e) by setting a cap 
for the Department of Revenue’s purchase of transferable tax credit 
certificates that had been issued under AS Section 43.55.023(d) or former 
AS Section 43.55.023(m) or to whom a production tax credit certificate has 
been issued under AS Section 43.55.025(f), mandating that the Department 
of Revenue cannot purchase a total of more than $70,000,000 in tax credit 
certificates from a person in a calendar year. 
8. House Bill 247, Section 24: Amendment Alaska Statutes Section 
43.55.028(g) 
Section 24 of HB 247 amends AS Section 43.55.028(g) by instructing 
the Department of Revenue to adopt regulations 
                                                                                                             
 8. ALASKA STAT. § 43.55.023(b)(2) (2016). 
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To carry out the purposes of this section, including standards and 
procedures to allocate available money among applications for 
purchases under this chapter and claims for refunds and 
payments under AS 43.20.046, 43.20.047, or 43.20.053 when the 
total amount of the applications for purchase and claims for 
refund exceed the amount of available money in the fund.9  
Section 24 of HB 247 also amends AS Section 43.55.028(g) by 
instructing the Department of Revenue, when adopting the above 
regulations, to grant preference to the applicant with a higher percentage of 
resident workers, as defined in AS 43.40.092(b), in the previous calendar 
year,10 and to 
provide for the purchase of the amount equal to the first 50 
percent of the credit repurchase limit for each person under [AS 
Section 43.55.028 (e)] of this section at a rate of 100 percent of 
the value of the certificate or portion of the certificate requested 
to be purchased and the amount equal to the next 50 percent of 
the credit repurchase limit for each person under [AS Section 
43.55.028 (e)] of this section at a rate of 75 percent of the value 
of the certificate or portion of the certificate requested to be 
purchased.11 
9. House Bill 247, Section 25: Amendment Alaska Statutes Section 
43.55.028 
Section 25 of HB 247 amends AS Section 43.55.028 by adding a new 
subsection, AS Section 43.55.028(j) in which the Department of Revenue is 
instructed, when making payment for a certificate or a refund, to deduct 
from said payment any outstanding liability, defined as “an amount of tax, 
interest, penalty, fee, rental, royalty, or other charge for which the state has 
issued a demand for payment that has not been paid when due.”12 Section 
25 of HB 247 makes clear that “satisfaction of an outstanding liability 
under this subsection does not affect the applicant's ability to contest that 
liability.”13 
                                                                                                             
 9. ALASKA STAT. § 43.55.028(g) (2016). 
 10. ALASKA STAT. § 43.55.028(g)(2) (2016). 
 11. ALASKA STAT. § 43.55.028(g)(3) (2016). 
 12. ALASKA STAT. § 43.55.028(j) (2016). 
 13. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
114 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 2 
  
 
10. House Bill 247, Section 26: Amendment Alaska Statutes Section 
43.55.028(f) and Section 43.55.028(g) 
Section 26 of HB 247 amends AS Section 43.55.028(f) by establishing 
effective dates for the twenty percent reduction for the gross value at the 
point of production of oil or gas produced from a lease or property north of 
68 degrees North latitude, as established therein. For oil and gas first 
produced from a lease or property after December 31, 2016, said reduction 
applies from the date of commencement of regular production of oil or gas, 
and expires either after three calendar years, whether consecutive or not, in 
which the price for Alaska North Slope crude oil for sale on the United 
States West Coast is more than $70; or after seven years, whichever comes 
first.  
Section 26 of HB 247 further amends AS Section 43.55.028(f) by 
establishing that the above referenced reduction for oil and gas first 
produced from a lease or property before January 1, 2017, expires either on 
January 1, 2023, or on the first day of January, following three years, 
whether consecutive or not, in which the price for Alaska North Slope 
crude oil for sale on the United States West Coast is more than $70. 
Section 26 of HB 247 amends AS Section 43.55.160(g) by making the 
ten percent reduction for the gross value at the point of production of oil or 
gas produced from a lease or property north of 68 degrees North latitude, as 
established therein, for oil and gas first produced from a lease or property 
after December 31, 2016, applicable from the date of regular production of 
oil or gas, but to expire either after three years, whether consecutive or not, 
in which the price for Alaska North Slope crude oil for sale on the United 
States West Coast is more than $70; or after seven years, whichever comes 
first.  
Section 26 of HB 247 further amends AS Section 43.55.160(g) by 
establishing that the above referenced reduction for oil and gas first 
produced from a lease or property before January 1, 2017, either expires on 
January 1, 2023, or expires on the first day of January, following three 
years, whether consecutive or not, in which the price for Alaska North 
Slope crude oil for sale on the United States West Coast is more than $70. 
11. House Bill 247, Section 32: Amendment Alaska Statutes Section 
43.70 
Section 32 of HB 247 amends AS Section 43.70 by adding a new 
section, Section 43.70.025 that requires that a business license applicant 
who is engaged in the business of oil or gas exploration, development, or 
production file a surety bond or a cash deposit or other acceptable 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol2/iss3/2
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negotiable security in the amount of $250,000 14 running to the state, 
conditioned upon the applicant's promise to pay all taxes, laborers, and 
suppliers.15 Said bond to remain in effect until “cancelled by action of the 
surety, the principal, or if the commissioner finds that the business is 
producing oil or gas in commercial quantities, by the commissioner.”16 
Section 32 of HB 247 also amends AS 43.70 by adding a new section, 
AS Section 43.70.028 that allows persons to bring suit upon the bond filed 
pursuant AS Section 43.70.025 in satisfaction of claims for the failure to 
pay a liability, as described in AS Section 43.70.025(a) above. Priority for 
claims pending against said shall be in descending order as follows: (1) 
material, equipment, and supplies delivered in the state;17 (2) labor, 
including employee benefits;18 (3) taxes and other amounts due to the city 
and borough, in that order;19 (4) repair of public facilities;20 and (5) taxes 
and other amounts due to the state.21   
III. Judicial Developments 
A. Supreme Court Cases 
1. City of Kenai v. Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC22 
In City of Kenai v. Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC, the 
Supreme Court of Alaska addressed for the first time whether the pore 
space or gas storage rights under a tract of land in which the minerals were 
reserved pursuant to a statutory requirement of Alaska Statute § 
38.05.125(a) are owned by the surface owner or the mineral owner. 
a) Facts and Proceedings 
“The Cannery Loop Sterling C Gas Reservoir is located approximately a 
mile below the Kenai River. The reservoir began producing natural gas in 
2000.” However, its gas supply was eventually depleted, leaving emptied 
                                                                                                             
 14. ALASKA STAT. § 43.70.025(a) (2016). 
 15. ALASKA STAT. § 43.70.025(a)(1), (2) (2016). 
 16. ALASKA STAT. § 43.70.025(c) (2016). 
 17. ALASKA STAT. § 43.70.028(a)(1) (2016). 
 18. ALASKA STAT. § 43.70.028(a)(2) (2016). 
 19. ALASKA STAT. § 43.70.028(a)(3) (2016). 
 20. ALASKA STAT. § 43.70.028(a)(4) (2016). 
 21. ALASKA STAT. § 43.70.028(a)(5). 
 22. City of Kenai v. Cook Inlet Nat. Gas Storage Alaska, LLC, 373 P.3d 473, 476 
(Alaska 2016). 
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pore spaces within the sedimentary rock which can be used to store non-
native gas.23  
The State of Alaska (the “State”) and Cook Inlet Region, Inc. (“CIRI”) 
own the right to minerals underlying the property because of mineral 
reservations required by the Alaska Land Act.  The City of Kenai (the 
“City”) was the owner of the surface rights to the property.  
“Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC [(“CINGSA”)] concluded 
that the State and CIRI held title to the pore space because they owned the 
mineral rights.” In 2011, CINGSA obtained leases from those entities to 
allow it to use the porous formation as a reservoir for storing injected 
natural gas. “But the City claimed an ownership interest in the storage 
rights and sought compensation” from CINGSA.  
CINGSA filed a complaint in March 2012 asking the superior court to 
decide who owns the storage rights and which party CINGSA should 
compensate for its use of the pore space. CINGSA then “filed for summary 
judgment arguing “CIRI and the State own the pore space and attendant 
storage rights because of the State’s reservation of certain subsurface 
interests as required by [Alaska Statute § 38.05.125(a)].” The superior court 
agreed and granted CINGSA’s motion for summary judgment.  The City 
appealed to the Supreme Court of Alaska.24 
b) Standard of Review 
A superior court’s decision on summary judgment is reviewed “de novo, 
drawing all inferences in favor of, and viewing the facts in the record in the 
light most favorable to, the non-moving party.”25 
c) Discussion 
The central issue in the case is whether the mineral owner or surface 
owner has rights to the underlying pore space or natural gas storage rights 
when the mineral and surface estates “have been severed, as they 
commonly are under Alaska’s mineral reservation statute, AS [§] 
38.05.125, a provision of the Alaska Land Act.”26 
The superior court had granted summary judgment to CINGSA, holding 
that “(1) determining ownership of the storage rights is a question of 
statutory rather than deed interpretation; (2) the reserved rights under 
Alaska Statute § 38.05.125(a) include natural gas storage rights; and (3) the 
                                                                                                             
 23. Id. at 475.  
 24. Id. at 476-77. 
 25. Id. (citing 43 U.S.C § 1601-1629h (2015)). 
 26. Id. at 477-78. 
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‘American rule’- by which the surface owner owns the rights to the 
underground spaces that have been depleted of their minerals – did not 
apply.”27 
(1) The superior court properly addressed the ownership of storage 
rights as a question of statutory interpretation 
“The State patents conveying the land at issue to the City recited 
verbatim the reservation of mineral rights that AS [§] 38.05.125(a) 
generally requires.”28 The City argued the superior court erred by not 
interpreting the reservation using rules of deed interpretation rather than 
statutory interpretation. The Court found the superior court’s application of 
a statutory interpretation to be proper because: (1) “A patent cannot convey 
what has been reserved by law”29; (2) patents “are to be given effect 
according to the laws and regulations under which they were issued”30; and 
that (3) “courts have consistently applied rules of statutory interpretation to 
determine the scope of contractual reservations required by statutes.” The 
Court concluded that “mineral reservations required by federal statutes are 
interpreted in light of the apparent intent of Congress, not the intent of the 
parties to the instrument.”31 
(2) Interpreting AS 38.05.125(a) to include the reservation of natural gas 
storage rights is consistent with the statute’s plain language and 
purpose. 
Alaska Statute § 38.05.125(a) requires that “[e]ach contract for the sale, 
lease, or grant of state land, and each deed to state land, properties, or 
interest in state land” be made subject to the States’ reservation of the rights 
to listed natural resources: “all oils, gases, coal, ores, minerals, fissionable 
materials, geothermal resources, and fossils of every name, kind or 
description, and which may be in or upon said land above described.”32 The 
statute also requires the reservation of rights of entry for exploration and the 
extraction of minerals, the reservation of surface rights necessary to support 
extraction, and the catchall reservation of “generally all rights and power in, 
                                                                                                             
 27. Id. at 478. 
 28. Id. at 477. 
 29. Id. at 479 (quoting Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 570 F.2d 881, 888 (10th Cir. 
1977)). 
 30. Id. (quoting Swendig v. Wash. Water Power Co., 265 U.S. 322, 332, 44 S.Ct. 496, 
68 L.Ed. 1036 (1924)). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 480 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.125(a)).  
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to, and over said land, whether herein expressed or not, reasonably 
necessary or convenient to render beneficial and efficient the complete 
enjoyment of the property and rights hereby expressly reserved.”33 
The City argued that the statute reserves only “specifically identified 
natural resources in the land and the right to make use of the land to aid in 
the development and extraction of those resources,” not “a place or location 
– the subsurface” – that would include non-mineral pore space.34 
When determining the meaning of a statute, a court looks to both the text 
and purpose of the statute. The statutory language is given a “reasonable or 
common sense construction, consonant with the objects of the 
legislature.”35 Contrary to private land grants, with public land grants, 
ambiguities “are resolved strictly against the grantee and in favor of the 
government.”36 
The Alaska Land Act does not define “minerals,” and the Court has not 
yet defined them in the context of Alaska Statute § 38.05.125(a). Other 
courts have found the term to be ambiguous and have interpreted it 
broadly.37  
“Pore space” has been defined as “microscopic voids within rocks that 
are unoccupied by solid material,” and is “an inextricable part of the rock 
strata in which it is found.”38 “Because porous rock formations are mineral, 
the parts that make them up are also mineral, including the microscopic 
pore space that constitutes much of these formations.”39 And because 
Alaska Statute § 38.05.125(a) broadly reserves “all . . . minerals,” the Court 
concluded that included the “constituent parts of those minerals.” 
The purpose of the Alaska Land Act is to “maximize revenue for the 
state”40 and sections of it have been interpreted as intended “to provide for 
                                                                                                             
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. (quoting Mech. Contractors of Alaska, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 91 
P.3d 240, 248 (Alaska 2004) (quoting Mack v. State, 900 P.2d 1202, 1205 (Alaska App. 
1995)). 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. at 481. 
 38. Id. (quoting Kevin L. Doran & Angela M. Cifor, Does the Federal Government 
Own the Pore Space under Private Lands in the West? Implications of the Stock-Raising 
Homestead Act of 1916 for Geologic Storage of Carbon Dioxide, 42 ENVTL. L. 527, 530 
(2012)). 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. at 481 (quoting Marathon Oil Co. v. State, Dep’t of Nat. Res., 254 P.3d 1078, 
1085 (Alaska 2011)). 
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orderly oil and gas leasing that maximizes state return on its oil and gas 
resources.”41  
The Court found the federal case Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc.42 to be 
instructive in illustrating how legislative purpose drives the definition of 
“minerals” in different statutory contexts. “In Watt v. Western Nuclear, 
Inc., the United States Supreme Court held that gravel found on lands 
patented under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act (SRHA) was a ‘mineral’ 
reserved to the United States by statute . . . [because] ‘Congress’ underlying 
purpose in severing the surface estate from the mineral estate was to 
facilitate the concurrent development of both surface and subsurface 
resources,’” and that “it sought to ensure that valuable subsurface resources 
would remain subject to disposition by the United States.”43 Similarly, “the 
Alaska Land Act contemplates retained State control over potential mineral 
wealth even as the surface estate passes to other parties for productive 
surface uses.”44  
Because the statutory language and persuasive authority suggest a broad 
interpretation of the term “minerals” in Alaska Statute § 38.05.125(a), and 
because interpreting “minerals” to include pore space is consistent with 
both the language and the purposes of the statute, the Court rejected the 
City’s argument and concluded that pore-space ownership is reserved as 
part of the mineral rights reserved under Alaska Statute § 38.05.125(a), and 
“storage, even for non-native natural gas, is reserved as part of the ‘rights 
and power in, to, and over said land…reasonably necessary or convenient 
to render beneficial and efficient the complete enjoyment’ of the State’s 
other reserved mineral rights.”45  
(3) The “American Rule” does not apply 
Courts have approached the issue of pore-space ownership with two 
main theories: the American Rule and the English Rule.  
[I]n the absence of language in the severing deed dictating a 
different construction, the English and Canadian rule is that the 
cavern which remains in the land after the hard minerals are 
                                                                                                             
 41. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. LeResche, 663 P.2d 923, 931 (Alaska 1983).  
 42. 462 U.S. 36, 60, 103 S. Ct. 2218, 76 L. Ed. 2d 400 (1983). 
 43. City of Kenai, 373 P.3d at 482. 
 44. Id. at 483. 
 45. Id.  
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mined is owned by the mineral interest owner; the America view 
is that the cavern is owned by surface owners.46  
The City argued for the Court to adopt the American rule, citing to Ellis 
v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. as the proper application of the American 
rule to gas storage rights. However, the Court found the present case to be 
distinguishable because in Ellis there was no statutory reservation at issue, 
leading the court in Ellis focus on the intent of the private parties, instead of 
the intent of a statute.47 The Court concluded that the American rule does 
not apply to a determination of the ownership of pore-space storage rights 
in a case involving a reservation of rights to the State under Alaska Statute 
38.05.125(a).48   
d) Conclusion 
Because the rights at issue are governed by the terms of the statutory 
reservation, and because the Court interpreted that reservation as including 
pore-space storage rights, the Court held that the superior court acted 
properly, and held that pore space or gas storage rights underlying a tract of 
land in which the minerals have been severed due to the statutory 
requirement of Alaska Statute § 38.05.125(a) belong to the mineral owners 
rather than the surface owners.  
The judgment of the superior court was affirmed.  
2. City of Valdez v. State49 
In City of Valdez v. State, the Supreme Court of Alaska addressed 
whether the appeal process on taxability determinations of oil and gas 
property that excludes the State Assessment Review Board (“SARB”), as 
established in Alaska Admin. Code tit. 15, § 56.015(b)-(c)50, is in conflict 
with Alaska Statute § 43.56.110.-.130 that requires SARB to hear 
administrative appeals of all “assessment[s]” of oil and gas property.51     
a) Regulatory Background 
In 1973 the legislature established an overarching regime for the 
statewide assessment of oil and gas property in order to levy ad valorem 
                                                                                                             
 46. Id. (quoting Ellis v. Ark. La. Gas Co., 450 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Okla. 1978) aff’d, 609 
F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1979)). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 484. 
 49. City of Valdez v. State, 372 P.3d 240 (Alaska 2016). 
 50. 15 AAC 56.015(b)-(c). 
 51. ALASKA STAT. § 43.56.110.-.130 (1973). 
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taxes.52 Under the statewide regime, codified as Alaska Statute § 43.56, 
Revenue manages the assessment process, determining whether property is 
taxable under Alaska Statute § 43.56 and, if so, its taxable value. 
Municipalities are permitted to tax oil and gas property located within their 
boundaries at the same rate as they do local property.53 
When “the legislature initially established this assessment scheme, all 
appeals of Revenue’s oil and gas property tax assessments were heard by 
SARB.”54 However, in 1986 Revenue promulgated a more detailed 
framework to govern the appeals, setting up a separate appeal track for 
appeals on the issue of taxability. Under this new track, appeals of 
Revenue’s determination on taxability still initially are appealed to 
Revenue, which issues an informal conference decision; however, an appeal 
from this informal conference decision is then heard by a hearing officer 
appointed by the Commissioner of Revenue, not by SARB.55 The hearing 
officer’s decision can then be appealed to the superior court, but unlike a 
valuation appeal, whether a taxability appeal is a trial de novo is in the 
discretion of the superior court judge.56 Therefore, through its regulation, 
Revenue has made an interpretation of “assessment” in Alaska Statute § 
43.56 to not include Revenue’s initial determination of taxability. 
b) Facts and Procedural History 
“The Trans-Alaska Pipeline System ([“TAPS”]) is an 800-mile-long oil 
pipeline system that connects the North Slope oil fields to a shipping 
terminal in Valdez,” crossing through the North Slope Borough (“NSB”), 
the Fairbanks North Star Borough (“FNSB”), and the City of Valdez 
(“Valdez”).57 “In February 2013 Revenue issued a notice of assessment for 
oil and gas property held by the TAPS owners for Assessment Year 2013.” 
The TAPS owners appealed this notice of assessment, objecting both to 
Revenue’s assessed value of the property and its determination that certain 
pieces of property were taxable as oil and gas property under Alaska Statute 
§ 43.56.58 
Both appeals proceeded simultaneously on the two separate appeal tracks 
(taxability and valuation) until each sat with the superior court. NSB then 
                                                                                                             
 52. Ch. 1, §1, FSSLA 1973. 
 53. ALASKA STAT. § 43.56.010(a)-(b). 
 54. City of Valdez., 372 P.3d at 244. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 245. 
 58. Id. 
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filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief with the superior 
court, followed by Valdez and FNSB successfully intervened and filed a 
separate complaint.59 The municipalities all challenged the validity of 
Alaska Admin. Code tit. 15, § 56.015(b)-(d) arguing the regulation 
impermissibly delegated the authority to decide taxability appeals to 
Revenue, contravening the statute’s grant of authority to SARB to hear all 
appeals from initial assessment of such property.60  
The intervenors moved for summary judgment, and the superior court 
denied the municipalities’ request to invalidate the regulation, and holding 
that Revenue’s interpretation was a permissible interpretation of the 
statue.61 The superior court then entered a final judgment to this effect. 
Valdez appealed that decision to the Supreme Court of Alaska.62 
c) Standard of Review 
The Supreme Court of Alaska (“the Court”) utilized a substitution of 
judgment review standard because this case involves both statutory 
interpretation of a non-technical statutory term, a task in which the courts 
are well versed, and the question of the scope of the relationship between 
Revenue and SARB’s jurisdictions.63 
In applying substitution of judgment review, a statute is interpreted de 
novo, taking into consideration the text, legislative history, and purpose 
behind the statute.64 Such determinations are made on a sliding scale where 
the plainer the language of the statute is, the more convincing any contrary 
legislative history must be to overcome the statues plain meaning.65 
d) Discussion 
Revenue promulgated Alaska Admin. Code tit. 15, § 56.015 in 1986, 
providing a more detailed framework to govern the appeals, setting up a 
separate appeal track for appeals on the issue of taxability.66 Subsection (a) 
provides for appeals of the assessed value of oil and gas property to be filed 
with Revenue, whose determination may then be further appealed to 
                                                                                                             
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 246. 
 63. Id. at 247. 
 64. Id. at 248. 
 65. Id. 
 66. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 56.015. 
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SARB.67 Subsections (b) and (c) set taxability appeals on a separate 
procedural route, still initially filed with Revenue, but whose determination 
may not be appealed to SARB, but instead are appealed to a formal hearing 
before Revenue.68 However, Alaska Statute § 43.56.110-.130 provides that 
SARB shall hear administrative appeals of all “assessment[s]” of oil and 
gas property.  
Valdez challenged the regulation arguing that Revenue not including the 
initial determination of taxability within its definition of “assessment” was 
in conflict with Alaska Statute § 43.56.110-.130 which requires that SARB 
shall hear administrative appeals of all “assessments” of oil and gas 
property.69 
The Court independently interpreted Alaska Statute § 43.56 utilizing the 
three metrics for statutory interpretation: text, legislative history, and 
purpose.70 
(1) Revenue’s Interpretation of “Assessment” Through Its Regulation Is 
Not Consistent With The Text Of AS 43.56 
First, the Court examined the plain text of the statute. Alaska Statute § 
43.56 does not define the term “assessment,” and the only explicit appellate 
path specified in Alaska Statute § 43.56 is through SARB. Therefore, the 
Court looked to the scope of the statutory term “assessment” within Alaska 
Statute § 43.56 to determine whether Alaska Statute § 43.56 is flexible 
enough to accommodate Revenue’s interpretation through its regulation.71 
(a) The text of the overall statutory scheme 
In examining how the term “assessment” was used throughout Alaska 
Statute § 43.56’s statutory scheme, the Court found, inter alia: 
i. Alaska Statue § 43.56.120 simply and unequivocally provides 
that whatever is appealed to Revenue under Alaska Statute § 
43.56.110 can be further appealed to SARB: “[a]fter a ruling by 
[Revenue] on an appeal made under AS 43.56.110, the owner or 
a municipality may further appeal to [SARB].”;72 
ii. Alaska Statute § 43.56.130 indicates that the legislature did not 
intend to grant SARB or Revenue the discretion to categorically 
                                                                                                             
 67. Id. at 56.015(a). 
 68. Id. at 56.015(b)-(c). 
 69. City of Valdez, 372 P.3d at 248. 
 70. Id. at 249. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 250 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 43.56.120) (emphasis added). 
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remove a class of appeals from SARB’s jurisdiction. Instead, it 
mandates that SARB “shall hear appeals filed under AS 
43.56.120(a).”;73 and 
iii. Alaska Statute § 43.56.135’s mandates that that Revenue “shall 
certify the final assessment roll and mail…a statement of the 
amount of tax due to each owner of taxable property by June 1 
each year.”74 The Court found (1) this requirement to imply that 
all issues relating to the assessment roll must be resolved at the 
administrative level by June 1 of each year; (2) this requirement 
must encompass taxability appeals, because an assessment roll is 
not final if it still contains property whose owners are disputing 
its taxability in appeal proceedings before Revenue; and (3) 
allowing taxability appeals at the administrative level to extend 
beyond June 1, as taxability appeals before Revenue currently 
do, contravenes this clear statutory requirement.75   
(b) Common usage of the term “assessment” 
Having found no definition for “assessment” in the context of property 
taxation in the entirety of the code, the Court examined dictionaries and 
texts in the field of property assessment in order to ascertain the meaning of 
“assessment.”76   
The edition of Black’s Law Dictionary in existence at the time of 
drafting and enactment of Alaska Statute § 43.56 defined “assessment” 
generally as “the process of ascertaining and adjusting the shares 
respectively to be contributed by several persons towards a common 
beneficial object according to the benefit received.”77 And also defined 
“assessment” specifically for the purposes of property taxation as “[t]he 
listing and valuation of property for the purpose of apportioning a tax upon 
it.”78 The Court found both definitions to contemplate the scope of 
“assessment” as including the initial identification of that property which as 
eligible for taxation.79  
                                                                                                             
 73. Id. (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 43.56.130) (emphasis in original). 
 74. Id. at 251 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 43.56.135). 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. (quoting Assessment, Black’s Law Dictionary (rev. 4th ed. 1968)) (emphasis in 
original). 
 78. Id. (quoting Assessment, Black’s Law Dictionary (rev. 4th ed. 1968)) (emphasis in 
original). 
 79. Id. 
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The Court examined two texts written by those who work in the field of 
property assessment. The first defined “assessment” with respect to 
property taxation as “the official act of discovering, listing, and appraising 
property, whether performed by an assessor, a board of review, or a 
court.”80 The second described the assessment process and the tasks of 
assessors as including the initial step of “locating and identifying all taxable 
property in the jurisdiction.”81 The court found these common definitions of 
“assessment” to indicate inclusion of the step of an initial determination of 
taxability.82  
(c) The significant consequences of Revenue’s interpretation 
The statute explicitly grants a party appealing a decision by SARB a 
right to a trial de novo in the superior court.83 In contrast, under Revenue’s 
interpretation, whether an appeal to the superior court of a taxability 
decision by Revenue is granted a trial de novo is left to the discretion of the 
superior court judge.84 If a discretionary trial de novo is not granted on a 
taxability claim, the superior court’s review of Revenue’s decision will be 
limited to the record on file with Revenue and will be deferential to 
Revenue’s findings.85 The Court found it unlikely the legislature would 
have intended for these serious consequences to arise from a distinction not 
provided for in the text of the statute.86 
The Court concluded that while Alaska Statute § 43.56’s plain text is 
silent on the scope of the term “assessment,” “the text of the overall 
statutory scheme, the common usage of the term ‘assessment’ in the 
property taxation context, and the significant consequences of Revenue’s 
interpretation of the statute” led to the conclusion that the statute’s text 
indicates that “assessment” “encompasses the initial taxability 
determination.”87 
  
                                                                                                             
 80. Id. at 252 (quoting Int’l Assoc. of Assessing Officers, Glossary for Property 
Appraisal and Assessment 11 (2d ed. 2013). 
 81. Id. (quoting Int’l Assoc. of Assessing Officers, Glossary for Property Appraisal and 
Assessment Administration 18 (Joseph K. Eckert ed., 1990)). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 252-53. 
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(2) Revenue’s Interpretation Of “Assessment” Through Its Regulation Is 
Not Consistent With The Legislative History of AS 43.56 
When interpreting a statute, the Court also examines the legislative intent 
behind the statute, applying a “sliding scale approach, where ‘[t]he plainer 
the statutory language is, the more convincing the evidence of contrary 
legislative purpose or intent must be.’”88 
The Court found the legislative history of Alaska Statute § 43.56 to 
supportive of the plain text of the statute, that being Revenue’s 
determination of the taxability of oil and gas property is part and parcel of 
the assessment process.89 “In a letter to the speaker of the house introducing 
the bill that would become codified as Alaska Statute § 43.56, then-
Governor Egan explained that ‘[SARB] is created to serve the function of 
the local board of equalization’ and that ‘[t]he manner of assessment and 
collection of the tax is similar to that provided for municipalities.’ Under 
Alaska Statute § 29.45, which establishes the manner in which 
municipalities assess and collect tax, the municipality’s governing body sits 
as a board of equalization when hearing appeals from municipal tax 
assessments.90 These municipal boards of equalization routinely hear both 
valuation and taxability appeals.”91 
The Court found it compelling that the legislature emphasized the virtue 
of condensing power to hear such appeals in a single entity.92 The 
committee drafting the bill heard extensive testimony on the need for a 
uniform standard for assessment of oil and gas property, and ultimately 
created only a single entity to hear appeals: SARB.93 The Court found it 
“exceedingly unlikely that the legislature intended to create a bifurcated 
appeal process without expressly doing so, particularly after hearing 
unrebutted testimony on the importance of uniformity.”94  
The legislative history shows the legislature modeled SARB after 
municipal boards of equalization and was aware of the importance of a 
uniform assessment process overseen by a single entity. The Court found 
both of these factors to be inconsistent with Revenue’s interpretation of the 
statute. 
                                                                                                             
 88. Id. (quoting State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n v. Carlson, 270 P.3d 755, 
762 (Alaska 2012) (alteration in original). 
 89. Id. (quoting 1973 House Journal 41). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 254. 
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(3) Revenue’s Interpretation Of “Assessment” Is Not Consistent With 
The Purpose Of AS 43.56 
“The goal of statutory construction is to give effect to the legislature’s 
intent, with due regard for the meaning the statutory language conveys to 
others.”95 The aim is to “construe a statute in light of its purpose.”96 The 
Court focused on two indicia of what the legislature intended “assessment” 
to mean in Alaska Statute § 43.56: (1) SARB decisions made nearly 
contemporaneously with the enactment of Alaska Statute § 43.56, and (2) 
the compressed timeline that the legislature set forth in Alaska Statute § 
43.56 for the resolution of appeals regarding assessments.97 
(a) Prior SARB decisions 
In 1974, only one year after the passage of Alaska Statute § 43.56 and 
the establishment of SARB, SARB issued an opinion describing the scope 
of its jurisdiction as including both taxability and valuation appeals 
concluding that: “[t]he standards set forth in AS 43.56 include both 
taxability and valuation standards. To say that [SARB] must accept without 
question the taxability of a particular piece of property would prevent 
[SARB] from acting as an appella[te] and . . . would subvert the legislative 
intent in creating [SARB].”98 The Court found such a nearly 
contemporaneous interpretation to be reliable indicia of legislative intent 
and supportive of the argument that “assessment” includes an initial 
determination of taxability.”99  
SARB continued to follow its 1974 interpretation of its own jurisdiction 
through 2008, at which point it began to abide by Revenue’s promulgated 
interpretation.100 However, the Court was not swayed by SARB’s recent 
acceptance of Revenue’s interpretation, pointing out that from its inception 
and for several subsequent decades SARB understood its jurisdiction to 
encompass taxability appeals.101    
                                                                                                             
 95. Id. (quoting City of Fairbanks v. Amoco Chem. Co., 952 P.2d 1173, 1178 (Alaska 
1998) (quoting Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Co. v. Kenai Pipe Line Co., 746 P.2d 896, 905 
(Alaska 1987)). 
 96. Id. (quoting Alaska for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz, 170 P.3d 183, 193 
(Alaska 2007)). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. (quoting Alaska Pipeline, No. 001-000-0015 (State Assessment Review Bd. Dec. 
9, 1974)). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
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(b) The timeline set forth in the statute 
The legislature set up a compressed time frame for appeals that requires 
all appeals from Alaska Statute § 43.56 initial assessment notices be 
resolved at the administrative level within approximately three months, by 
no later than June 1 of each year.102  
In contract, the process promulgated by Revenue for taxability appeals 
can take years for a final judgment to be rendered. The Court found such a 
lengthy process to be contrary to the expedited timeline the legislature set 
forth for appeals before SARB, and preventative of valuation appeals 
before SARB from being decided in the timely manner prescribed by the 
legislature due to valuation appeals before SARB sometimes being stayed 
pending resolution of taxability appeals before Revenue.103  
The Court recognized the grave financial implications such a lengthy 
process for taxability appeals before Revenue could have on affected 
municipalities because they must refund overpayments of taxes to taxpayers 
at eight percent interest and must plan annual budgets without knowing 
their expected tax revenue.104 
The Court held Revenue’s interpretation of Alaska Statute § 43.56 
through its regulation to be inconsistent with the statute’s text, legislative 
history, and purpose, and therefore, rendered the challenged regulation 
invalid because it has no reasonable basis in the statute and thus falls 
outside of Revenue’s statutory authority.105 
e) Conclusion 
The Court reversed the superior court’s decision and remanded for entry 
of judgment in favor of the City of Valdez, holding that (1) Revenue’s 
interpretation of Alaska Statute § 43.56, through its regulation Alaska 
Admin. Code tit. 15, § 56.015(b)-(c), was inconsistent with the statute’s 
text, legislative history, and purpose106; and (2) Revenue’s interpretation 
rendered the regulation invalid because it had no reasonable basis in the 
statute and thus, fell outside of Revenue’s statutory authority.107 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. at 256. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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